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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. C. TOLMAN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., ; 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 1 
MYTON WATER ASSOCIATION, ) 
Defendant-Respondent ) 
Case No. 14,555 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Action by plaintiff general contractor against defendant 
water association for alleged breach of construction contract 
and for quantum meriut covering construction of some 65 miles 
of culinary water pipelines and five equalizing reservoirs and 
pumping facilities in the rural area in and around Myton, Utah. 
Defendant denied plaintiff's claims and by way of counter-claim, 
defendant asserted a claim against plaintiff for liquidated 
damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by Honorable J. Robert Bullock, 
District Judge, sitting without a jury, on February 24-26, 1976 
upon a stipulated Pretrial Order (R.16-19 incl.) and was argued 
to the Court on February 27, 1976 (R.25). On March 8, 1976 the 
trial court issued its Memorandum Decision holding in favor 
of the defendant and against the plaintiff on both counts of 
plaintifffs complaint and holding in favor of defendant on its 
counterclaim as to only $8,4 00.00 of liquidated damages retained 
by defendant. (R.26, 27). 
On April 5, 1976 the trial court entered its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R.28-36 incl.) and Judgment of no 
cause of action on the First Cause of Action of plaintiff's 
complaint and dismissing the Second Cause of Action of plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice and dismissing defendant's counterclaim 
for liquidated damages in excess of $8,400.00 incurred after 
April 1, 1972 with prejudice. (R.37, 38). No post-judgment 
motions were filed by plaintiff and on April 20, 1976 plaintiff 
filed its Notice of Appeal herein (R.39). Plaintiff-appellant 
will be hereinafter styled plaintiff and defendant-respondent 
will be hereinafter styled defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to affirm in all respects the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment made and entered herein 
by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant cannot agree with plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts because the facts are there stated for the most part in 
a light most favorable to plaintiff, who lost below, and in so 
doing violates the time-honored rule that the facts on appeal 
must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the Findings and 
Judgment below. The main objection to plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts goes to its emphasis on facts favorable to plaintiff's 
position while either ignoring or only paying lip service to 
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those which are unfavorable to it. And so, defendant believes it 
not only proper, but essential that a statement be made setting 
forth the facts of the case as found by the trial court and as 
supported by the evidence with appropriate references to the 
exhibits (Ex. ), the file and transcript (R. ), abstract of 
transcript (A, ) and Findings of Fact (F. ). 
The overall project comprised the construction of culinary 
water facilities to supply culinary water to the rural inhabitants 
of the North Myton Bench, South Myton Bench, Pleasant Valley and 
the inhabitants of Myton, Utah consisting of some 65 miles of 
pipelines and five equalizing reservoirs and pumping facilities 
(Exs. P-2, P-3; A.%, R.436; A.104, R.474). It was to be financed 
with a loan and grant from the Farmers Home Administration. (Ex. 
P-2, §1.1.05, p.1.1). 
The plans and specifications were prepared by Nielsen 
and Maxwell, consulting engineers employed by defendant. The 
overall project was divided into two separate projects for bidding 
purposes, ie. Schedule A, being all construction north of the 
Duchesne River and Schedule B, being all construction south of 
the Duchesne River. (A.88, R.435). The invitation for bids was 
set up such that contractors could bid on either Schedule A or 
Schedule B or both (A.88, 89; R.435). There was only one point 
where the two schedules would connect which would work out well 
for two contractors if that were the way it went. (A.88, R.435). 
It was anticipated that a six-months construction period 
was ample to construct each schedule with proper equipment. (A.89, 
R.436; A.105, R.476). An additional 90 days was allowed to cover 
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the winter period, if necessary. (A.89, R.436). And so, defendant 
made the decision to fix the contract completion time at 270 days 
knowing that to crowd a contractor on time would result in a higher 
bid, but if ample time is given the best bid is obtained, (R.435, 
436). The entire project had to be completed within 270 calendar 
days whether each schedule was constructed by different contractors 
or by the same contractor. (Ex. P-2, §1.3.08, p.l.5d; §2.5.02, 
p.2.16). 
Prior to bidding, R. C. Tolman, president of plaintiff, 
toured the construction area in an automobile with other contrac-
tors and R. J. Mathews, then a member of the board of directors 
of defendant. (A.41, R.251; A.58, R.306). Mr. Mathews pointed 
out trouble spots such as the Dry Gulch crossing and the rocky 
and steep conditions on R line to which Mr. Tolman responded "no 
problem". They observed the wet areas through the salt grass, 
the alkalais, the willows and rock outcrops and this sort of 
thing. (A.58, R.307). Mr. Tolman stayed over another day and 
went over the project again, visiting the tank sites and getting 
himself closer familiar with existing conditions. He then came 
out prior to the bid-opening day and visited the site some more 
and worked up his bid in Roosevelt in a motel. (A.15, R.130). 
Before bidding the job, Mr. Tolman read the contract 
documents and was familiar with §1.2.01 of the specifications 
(Ex. P-2, §1.2.01 d., p.1.2) requiring the contractor to inform 
himself as to the local conditions. (A.41, R.250). Prior to 
submitting his bid Mr. Tolman knew that the job was going to 
terminate in February, 1972 because of the 270-day provision.(A- 41) 
(R.251). 
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Plaintiff then bid on both Schedule A at $360,735.00 and 
Schedule B at $245,070.06 for a total of $605,805.96 for both. 
(Ex. P-2 pp.1.5a., 1.5c). In plaintiff's proposal, Mr. Tolman 
verified that he had examined the location of the proposed work, 
the drawings, specifications and other contract documents and was 
familiar with the local conditions where the work was to be per-
formed. (Ex. P-2, §1.3.03, p.1.4, R.255). 
The bid opening was held on March 11, 1971 and plaintiff's 
bid was the low bid on each schedule. Defendant had 60 days 
after the bid opening date within which to award the contract. 
(Ex. P-2, §1.2.Oil, p. 1.2; A.42, R.254). Defendant's Board of 
Directors awarded the contract to plaintiff on May 7, 1971 being 
within the 60-day period (A.90, R.438; A.106, R.478) being soon 
after completion of the legal documents with the Farmers Home 
Administration for release of the funds. (A.55, R.297). 
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract 
dated May 7, 1971, under which plaintiff agreed to furnish all 
the necessary materials, labor, equipment, tools and services 
necessary for the complete construction of the Culinary Water 
Facilities under both Schedule A and Schedule B near Myton, Utah 
in accordance with the drawings, specifications and other contract 
documents prepared by defendant's engineer and that the total 
contract price based upon unit prices of the estimated quantities 
of work and material, was the sum of $605,805.96. However, under 
the terms of said contract the right was reserved in defendant to 
increase or decrease any item or items of work by 25% and sequential 
deletions of lines were specifically provided for in case const-
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ruction funds were inadequate to complete the designated construc-
tion as bid. (Ex. P-2, §3.1, par. 5, p,3.L). The total contract 
price would be adjusted according to the actual quantities of 
work and materials constructed and completed by plaintiff in 
accordance therewith. (Exs. P-2, P-3; F.2, R.29; F.6, R.30). 
Notice to Proceed was issued on May 17, 1971 (Ex. P. 6; 
A.2, R.63) and under the terms of the contract (Ex. P-2, §2.5.02, 
p.2.16) plaintiff agreed to commence the work and complete the 
entire construction of the culinary water facilities under both 
Schedule A and Schedule B on or before February 18, 1972 being 
27 0 calendar days after the commencement of the contract time on 
May 24, 1971, (Ex. P-2, §1.3.08, p.l.5d) and the parties agreed 
that in the event plaintiff did not complete the work by Febr-
uary 18, 1972, liquidated damages in the amount of $100.00 per day 
on Schedule A plus $100.00 per day on Schedule B, for a total of 
$200.00 per day on Schedules A and B combined would be paid by 
plaintiff to defendant for each consecutive calendar day after 
February 18, 1972 during which the work remained uncompleted 
(Ex. P-2, §1.3.09, p. 1.5d; §1.4.07a., p.1.8) and the trial court 
so found. (F.3, R.29). 
Plaintiff commenced construction of the work on or about 
June 7, 1971, being three weeks after the Notice to Proceed was 
issued. From the beginning, plaintiff began incessant "leap 
frogging11, ie. construct a ways, for some reason jump to a spot 
down the line in the system, (R.4 39)
 ancj w a s repeatedly called 
to plaintiff's attention. (Ex. P-41, R.466; Ex. D-64, R.427). 
As to the surface water conditions, there were wet areas 
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but not large amounts of irrigation waters or surface waters 
flowing into the trenches during construction (A.65, R.339; A.59, 
R.310; R.409; A.93, R.446). Farmers in the area attempted to 
cooperate with plaintiff in an effort to reduce the waste water 
problems. for example, the witness Calvin Monks withheld taking 
his water on two occasions to accommodate plaintiff and he lost 
production because of it. (A.78, 79, R.391-393 inclusive). 
Likewise, the witness Frank Liddell held his water off. (R.407). 
The witness Harold White, as Watermaster for Dry Gulch Irrigation 
Company, shifted part of the water from the North Township Ditch 
along the Ioka Road to the South Township Ditch to accommodate 
plaintiff's construction (A.85, R.417, 418). He held the water 
out of one ditch for two weeks during which the farmers missed 
two turns and were getting pretty upset. (A.86, R.419). He held 
water out of another lateral for more than two turns. (A.87, 
R.419, 424). All of the witnesses who lived in the area testi-
fied that the water conditions encountered were normal for this 
area. (A.10, R.112; 378, 398-400 incl., 425; A.86, R.420). 
The trial court found that the contract dated May 7, 
1971 required plaintiff to control the ground water and to pre-
vent surface waters from entering the trenches and excavations 
and to make adequate provision therefore in the installation and 
construction of the culinary water facilities; that the delays, 
if any, in the performance of the work by plaintiff caused by 
ground water or surface waters resulted from the failure of 
plaintiff to adequately control or make provision therefor; and 
that the construction conditions caused by the ground waters and 
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surface waters did not result from any act, or omission, or 
conduct of defendant. (F.ll, R.31, 32), 
As to the cemented cobblerock, the specifications were 
drawn such that the bidders would be responsible to make their 
own field investigations. Field inspections with the natives 
were set up and prospective bidders could see from road cuts 
and from all evidence on the ground as to what would be involved 
and in that manner make their own determinations of what their 
costs would be. (A.89, R.437). On a project of this type scat-
tered out for 65 miles, it would be meaningless for the owner to 
auger holes to determine sub-surface conditions and to do so might 
impose liability if representations with auger holes turned out 
to be different. (A.89, R.436, A.104, 105, R.474). The cond-
itions encountered with respect to cobblerock and "hard pan" and 
the quicksand are conditions normal for the area, and if one were 
familiar with the soil variations he would expect to encounter 
these on the Myton Bench. (A.7, R.96). 
The specifications provide that no classification of 
excavated materials will be made for excavation and backfill for 
pipelines (Ex. P-2, §4.4, par. 2, p.4.10) and structural excava-
tion (Ex. P-2, §4.1, par. 3, p.4.1) shall include the removal 
and subsequent handling of all water, earth, shale, loose or 
cemented gravel, loose rock, solid rock and other materials of 
whatever nature excavated or otherwise removed in the perform-
ance of the contract work. (Ex. P-2, §4.1, par. 3, p.4.1; 
§4.4, par. 5(b), p.4.11). Mr. Tolman knew when he bid this job 
that under the above specifications he would have to excavate 
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whatever material he encountered (A.44, R.262) or existed along 
the alignment of the pipeline as shown on the plans, whether he 
encountered sand, conglomerate or clay and that was the risk he 
takes as a contractor. (A.44, R.263). 
The trial court found that the plans and specifications 
furnished by defendant to plaintiff adequately located, described 
and covered the nature and extent of the culinary water facilities 
to be constructed and the general construction conditions to be 
encountered and that the evidence fails to show that such plans 
or specifications were inaccurate or deficient in any material 
respect. (F.9, R.31). 
During the course of construction there were 13 changes 
in line locations that were more noticeable than a foot or two, 
none of which were covered by a change order, but were field 
changes handled by the inspectors and project engineer where 
there was no particular change in contract amount or time. (A.54, 
R.294). The 13 changes are shown in red on Exhibit D-61 covering 
Schedule A and Exhibit D-62 covering Schedule B and are incorpor-
ated into the as-built drawings marked Exhibits D-58 and D-59. 
(A.93, 94; R.294, 449). The nature and extent of each change was 
detailed by the witness Maxwell, practically all of which were 
either requested by plaintiff or were made to accommodate the 
plaintiff by either easier construction or to give him more room 
to work. (A.93-95 incl., R.446-449 incl.). 
The trial court found that the work performed by plaintiff 
in the construction of the culinary water facilities was pursuant 
to and within the scope of the contract dated May 7, 1971, and 
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the terms and provisions thereof are controlling on the rights 
and obligations of the party; that minor changes in the alignment 
of some segments of the pipelines were made primarily for the 
benefit of plaintiff and at its request; that such changes and 
other minor modifications did not materially change the construc-
tion of the culinary water facilities project; and that the 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
is wholly insufficient to show that the work performed by plaint-
iff was without or beyond the scope of said contract or that 
there was any material deviation therefrom. (F.19, R.34). 
During construction, a new classification of rock was 
agreed upon resulting in two change orders. (Ex. D-67; A.101, 
R.466a, 467). Change Order One dated October 21, 1971 covered 
an increase in the quantity of rock excavated and Change Order 
Two dated November 22, 1971 covered a decrease in the quantity 
of rock excavated as a result of a new classification of rock. 
(A.101, R.466a, 467). Adjustments to the contract price were 
made by the Change Orders, but there was no adjustment in the 
contract time. (Ex. D-67; Ex. P-2, §2.5.05, p.2.16). 
The trial court found that during the course of construc-
tion of the culinary water facilities, minor items of extra work 
were performed by plaintiff and items of work were deleted and 
adjustments were made to the total contract price therefore, all 
by and with the agreement of the parties, and the evidence fails 
to show that any work not contemplated by or provided for in the 
contract has been performed by plaintiff for which plaintiff has 
not been paid. (F.13, R.32, 33). 
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The furnishing of water for testing the completed 
system was left to the option of the contractor. (A.104, R.472, 
473). However, if the water from the well was available, the 
plaintiff could use it but there was no commitment as to time. 
(A.104, R.472, 473). The specifications required plaintiff to 
furnish all materials for completion of the project which includ-
ed testing of the lines, and there is no provision requiring the 
defendant to furnish the testing water. (A.45, R.264, 265). 
The trial court found that the contract dated May 7, 
1971 required plaintiff to furnish all water for construction 
purposes, including water for pressure testing, disinfection, 
flushing and placing the culinary water facilities into service 
and the evidence fails to show that defendant failed to furnish 
any of the facilities required of it under said contract. (F.10, 
R.31) . 
There were some $19,000 in project work deleted under the 
25% deductible alternative with no corresponding shortening in 
contract time. (A.49, R.279). The deducted items were adjusted 
by the final change order and the final total contract price was 
adjusted to the sum of $585,749.78. (A.101, R.467, F.6, R.30). 
During the course of construction, plaintiff was repeat-
edly advised of numerous deficiencies in the manner in which the 
construction of work was proceeding including clean-up work, im-
proper compaction of back-filled trenches, skipping of sections 
of lines, failure to control water in the trenches, turnover of 
job personnel and their lack of experience and that the specifi-
cations were not being adhered to. (Ex. P-41; Ex. D-64, letters 
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dated August 16, 1971, August 31, 1971, September 1, 1971). Like-
wise plaintiff was notified that he was behind schedule, would need 
to double his rate of progress to complete the project within the 
contract time, that the liquidated damage provision would be en-
forced and that extensions of time were not justified. (Ex. D-64, 
letters dated October 15, 1971, October 16, 1971, November 26, 1971, 
January 12, 1972). 
Plaintiff did not finally complete the entire work required 
under Schedule A or Schedule B until July 31, 1972 when defendant 
issued its Certificate of Completion thereon. However, the work 
required under both Schedule A and Schedule B was substantially 
completed by April 1, 1972 being 42 calendar days late when water 
was placed in the culinary water facilities and was available for 
use by defendant and its consumers. (A.54, R.295; A.82, R.403; 
A.98, R.460; F.4, R.30). 
The trial court found that the failure of plaintiff to 
complete the work required of it under the contract dated May 7, 
1971 by February 18, 1972 resulted solely from the acts and con-
duct of plaintiff and its failure to complete the work in a 
reasonable and prudent manner; its failure to properly organize 
and schedule its work; and its failure to provide adequate crews, 
equipment and machinery to perform the work under the conditions 
encountered; that such conditions were normal for the area in 
which the work was performed and which the plaintiff knew or 
should have known would exist. (F.8, R.31). 
During the period February 19, 1972 to July 31, 1972 
defendant provided inspection services on the work performed 
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by plaintiff during that period on the construction of the culin-
ary water facilities for which defendant incurred extra and 
additional costs and expenses in the sum of $8,500.00. (Ex. 
D-70; R.458). The trial court found that such inspection services 
were necessary to insure continued construction of the culinary 
water facilities by plaintiff in accordance with the contract 
documents; and that such additional inspection services and 
expenses incurred by defendant were the direct result of the 
failure of the plaintiff to complete the contract work on or 
before February 18, 1972 as required by the contract dated May 
7, 1971. (R.457, 458; F.5, R.30). 
Defendant retained the sum of $8,400.00 from its final 
payment to plaintiff as liquidated damages for the 42-calendar-
day delay in substantial completion based upon the amount of 
$200.00 per day on Schedules A and B combined for the period 
February 19, 1972 to March 31, 1972 inclusive and defendant paid 
to the plaintiff the total sum of $577,349.78 under the contract 
dated May 7, 1971. (R.18, A.82, R.404; F.7, R.30, 31). 
The trial court found that the plaintiff breached the 
contract dated May 7, 1971 by its failure to complete the work 
required under Schedule A and Schedule B by February 18, 1972 
without reasonable cause for delay and as a direct result thereof 
defendant was damaged by the delay in providing culinary water 
to its consumers and by incurring additional and extra costs and 
expenses for inspection services in the sum of $8,500.00 during 
the period of delay. (F.17, R.33, 34). 
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The trial court further found that the contract dated 
May 7, 1971 was substantially completed on April 1, 1972 and the 
amount of $8,400.00 deducted from the contract price by defendant, 
as liquidated damages during the period from February 19, 1972 to 
March 31, 1972 inclusive, being 42 calendar days, is within the 
terms of said contract and is the agreed and liquidated damages 
and is reasonable and is not a penalty. (F.18, R.34). 
The trial court specifically found that defendant fully 
complied with the terms and provisions of the contract dated 
May 7, 1971 in all material respects, and fully performed all 
of the duties and obligations required of it thereunder, and 
there has been no breach by defendant of any of the terms or 
provisions of said contract. (F.16, R.33). 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
While it is true that the trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision (R.26) ruled against plaintiff because plaintiff failed 
to prove any of its claims by a preponderance of the evidence, 
it is equally true that the trial court made specific findings 
of fact against plaintiff on each of its claims. (R.28-34 incl.). 
Plaintiff asserts that it sustained its burden and there is no 
relevant or material evidence to the contrary. That simply is 
not sol The facts of this case were hotly contested as witnessed 
by some 437 pages of transcript and 72 exhibits. The record in 
this case is replete with oral and documentary evidence contra-
dictory to plaintifffs contentions. To say as plaintiff does 
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that this case does not involve a conflict in facts is absurd. 
The whole controversy revolved around whether the delay 
in completing the project resulted from plaintiff's own acts 
and conduct or the alleged conduct on the part of the defendant. 
The trial court specifically found that the delays were plaintiff's 
own doing and did not result from any act or conduct of the 
defendant. (F.14, R.33). 
To say that defendant offered no evidence to counter-act 
plaintiff's enumerable summaries of the time consumed in extensive 
leapfrogging, etc., and costs involved misses the point. Defend-
ant's evidence went to the heart of the cause of the delays, ie. 
the plaintiff's conduct or misconduct in failing to properly con-
struct or complete the project within the project time. The cold, 
hard facts are that the trial court simply did not believe the 
plaintiff's story and that should end it. 
Defendant cannot agree that the justification or lack 
thereof of the plaintiff's delays hinge primarily on the inter-
pretation of the contract documents and applicable law. Rather, 
there was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether the 
claimed flooding or winter weather were as bad as plaintiff says 
or even impeded plaintiff's work, particularly in light of the 
inadequate equipment and personnel employed by plaintiff to do 
the job. Suffice it to say, the trial court found the facts 
against plaintiff on both scores. 
To say that plaintiff's ability to prevail on its claims 
for delays because of cobblerock conditions and flooding depends 
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primarily on its justification in relying upon the Soil Condition 
specification (Ex, P-2, §3.1 , par. 2, p.3.1.) is not only pre-
posterous, but overlooks 
(1) plaintiff's duty to visit the site of the work and 
fully inform itself as to all existing conditions and limit-
ations (Ex. P-2, §1.2.Old, p.1.2) and plaintiff's verification 
that it did so (Ex. P-2, §1.3.03, p.1.4); 
(2) The no-classification of materials specification for 
excavation and backfill for pipelines (Ex. P-2, §4.4, par. 2, 
p.4.10); 
(3) plaintiff's obligation to keep the trenches free 
from water during excavation, pipe-laying and backfilling and to 
prevent surface waters from entering the trenches (ibid. par. 
4, p.4.10; 
(4) requirements for excavation in ledge rock, cobblerock, 
stones, mud or other materials unsuitable for pipe foundation 
(ibid. par. 5(b), p.4.11, and 
(5) the no-classification of excavated materials for 
structural excavation requiring removal and handling of all 
water, shale, loose or cemented gravel, loose rock, solid rock, 
and the control of both surface and ground water (Ex. P-2, §4.1, 
par. 3, p.4.1). 
Likewise, plaintiff simply assumes that the defendant 
was required to furnish testing and chlorinization water without 
citing any specification or provision in the contract documents 
which require defendant to do so and all the while ignoring 
(1) plaintiff's obligation to furnish all the necessary 
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materials, labor, equipment, tools and services necessary for 
the complete construction of the culinary water facilities (Ex. 
P-2, §1.3.02, p.1.4); 
(2) plaintiff's obligation to provide and pay for water 
for construction (Ex. P-2, §3.1, par. 6, p.3.2); 
(3) that payments per foot of pipe shall be full compen-
sation for excavation and backfill, furnishing and installing 
the pipe complete with bedding (including import of select bedding 
material where native material is not satisfactory), removal and 
disposal of excess excavated material, pressure testing, disinfec-
tion, flushing and placing the line into service (Ex. P-2, §3.2, 
par. 2, p.3.4), and 
(4) that plaintiff was required to test, flush and disin-
fect the water lines upon completion of the system at plaintiff's 
expense. (Ex. P-2, §4.13, par. 2, p.4.26). 
Plaintiff's assertions that the plans and specifications 
were inadequate in the particulars claimed were hotly and fac-
tually contested and the trial court squarely found that the 
plans and specifications furnished by defendant to plaintiff 
adequately located, described and covered the nature and extent 
of the culinary water facilities to be constructed and the 
general conditions to be encountered. (F.9, R.31). Such finding 
is fully supported by the evidence in this case as documented 
under the foregoing Statement of Facts. That being so, plaintiff 
should not be heard to complain about it on this appeal. 
The sum and substance of it all is that plaintiff bid 
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this job on the same specifications and under the same conditions 
as did the other competitive bidding contractors. Plaintiff's 
troubles on this job resulted solely from its conduct or mis-
conduct and if plaintiff lost money as a result thereof, it 
should not expect defendant to bail it out to the tune of 
$113,889.98 or any sum. Plaintiff's self-caused delays cost 
the defendant an additional $8,500.00 in inspection fees which 
defendant should not have to absorb. That's the way the trial 
court saw it and that is the way it should be. 
POINT I 
UNDER THE CARDINAL RULES OF APPELLATE REVIEW, THE 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IN THIS CASE MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
In its appeal, plaintiff takes exception to all findings 
and conclusions, urging that plaintiff had sustained its burden 
and that there is no relevant and material evidence to the 
contrary. (App. Brief, p.14). After reading some 107 pages of 
the Abstract of Record prepared by plaintiff and 4 37 pages of 
transcript and 72 exhibits, such assertion has to be a most 
startling revelation. Suffice it to say, the record is replete 
with contradictory evidence and testimony and the facts as found 
by the trial court are fully supported thereby. 
Dispositive of this appeal is Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 
2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) wherein this court held that in 
considering such an attack on the Findings and Judgment of the 
trial court, it is the duty of this court to follow these cardinal 
rules of review, to-wit: 
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(1) To indulge them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; 
(2) To require the appellant to sustain the burden of 
showing error; 
(3) To review the record in the light most favorable to 
them; and 
(4) Not to disturb them if they find substantial support 
in the evidence. 
As to (1) and (2) above, the presumptions favor the 
correctness and credibility of the Findings and Judgment, and the 
burden of showing that they are in error and should be overturned 
is upon the attackee. Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 
P.2d 28 (1972); First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 
Utah 2d 521 P.2d 563 (1974). 
As to (3) above, plaintiff recites the evidence most 
favorable to its contentions, to the exclusion of other evidence 
favorable to defendant, which is not permissible on appellate 
review. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972). 
The established rule of review on appeal is that this Court 
surveys the evidence in the light favorable to the trial court's 
Findings, First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 Utah 
2d. 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971). Plaintiff has leaned largely on facts 
favorable to itself to the exclusion of other facts of contradic-
tory nature which appear in the record. The opposite is the 
correct rule here ie.,the evidence favorable to defendant must be 
considered to the exclusion of contrary evidence, Hoggan & Hall & 
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Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1966). 
As to (4) above, it is the trial court's prerogative 
to determine the facts in a breach of contract action. Santi 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 21 Utah 2d 157, 
442 P.2d 921 (1968), and this being an action at law as noted 
in Leon Glazier and Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 
P.2d 226 (1971) it needs no citation of authorities that if 
there is substantial evidence to support the Judgment of the 
court below, this court will affirm. 
More important, here is the rule of appellate review 
governing the refusal of a trial court to make Findings essen-
tial to appellant's cause. Here plaintiff claims that the 
trial court should have held as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff had sustained its burden of proof on its various 
claims (App. Brief p.49). Thus, plaintiff's basic assertion 
of error is the refusal of the trial court to find in favor 
of plaintiff on its specific claims. The correct rule in 
such instance is that unless the evidence is such that all 
reasonable minds would so conclude and thus compel such a 
finding, this court will not upset the trial court's refusal 
to so find. Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Co., 2 3 Utah 2d 86, 
458 P.2d 625 (1969) First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed 
Co., Supra; Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 
(1972), Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis in the evid-
ence upon which the trial court, acting fairly thereon, could rem-
ain unconvinced, then this court will not command that such a find-
ing be made. People's Finance and Thrift v. Landes, 28 Utah 2d 392, 
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503 P.2d 444 (1972), The rule is well stated in First Western 
Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., Supra, on page 3 of the Utah 
Reports as follows: 
Where the appellant's position is that the trial 
court erred in refusing to make certain findings 
essential to its right to recover, and insists that 
the evidence compels such findings, it is obligated 
to show that there is credible and uncontradicted 
evidence which proves those contended facts with 
such certainty that all reasonable minds must so 
find. Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis, 
either in the evidence or from the lack of evidence 
upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they 
are not so convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence, then the findings should not be overturned. 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, the evidence in this case, as hereinabove summarized 
in defendant's Statement of Facts, with direct references to the 
record and transcript, make it abundantly clear that the findings 
of the trial court are, in fact, supported by substantial, com-
petent evidence in the Record. It is plaintiff's burden in this 
appeal to show the contrary which plaintiff has wholly failed 
to do. Likewise, it is plaintiff's burden to show that there 
is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves plaintiff's 
contended facts with such certainty that all reasonable minds 
must so find which plaintiff again has wholly failed to do. That 
being so, the findings of the trial court should not be disturbed 
on this appeal. And since the Conclusions of Law are predicated 
upon and are supported by the findings, such conclusions must be 
affirmed. Likewise, since the Judgment follows the conclusions, 
it too must be affirmed herein. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS ADEQUATELY 
DESCRIBED AND COVERED THE GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
CONDITIONS. 
The trial court specifically found that the plans and 
specifications furnished by defendant to plaintiff adequately 
described and covered the general construction conditions to 
be encountered. (F.9, R.31). Plaintiff challenges the fore-
going finding and contends that the Soils Conditions specification 
(Ex. P-2, §3.1, par. 2, p.3.1) standing alone is defective 
as a matter of law while acknowledging that plaintiff was obliged 
to and did verify that it was familiar with the local conditions 
where the work was to be performed. (Ex. P-2, §1.3.03, p.1.4). 
Yet plaintiff chooses to ignore the no-classification of materials 
specification for excavation and backfill of pipelines (Ex. P-2, 
§4.4, par. 2, p.4.10), and the special instructions covering 
excavation for trenches in ledgerock, cobblerock, stones, mud, 
etc., (ibid. par. 5(b), p.4.11) and the Control of Ground-Water 
specifications (ibid. par. 4, p.4.10) requiring plaintiff to 
keep trenches free from water and to prevent surface water from 
entering the trenches. More so, plaintiff ignores the admission 
of Mr. Tolman that at the time he bid the job he knew that the 
above no-classification of materials specification required him 
to excavate whatever material he ran into (A.44, R.262, 263) 
whether it was sand or conglomerate or clay or whatever because 
that is the risk he takes as a contractor. (R.263). Yet plaintiff1 
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own witness, Arnold, testified that the conditions encountered 
with respect to the cobble and hardpan and quicksand were normal 
or customary for most of the area (R.95) which could have been 
discovered through inquiry and were no surprise to him (R.96). 
Likewise, plaintiff1s own witness, Ivie, testified that the 
conditions experienced with respect to ground water and sand were 
normal conditions for that area. (R.114). 
Plaintiff's repeated criticisms of the defendant for not 
conducting subsurface investigations can be put to rest by the 
testimony of defendant's consulting engineer Maxwell. (R.436, 
437, 474). The substance thereof is that it is not the normal 
practice in a project of this type scattered out over 65 miles 
to prepare borings to determine sub-surface conditions. Such 
borings become quite meaningless because it is not feasible to 
represent every change in material. It is the option of the owner 
to do so and if done could be misleading and subject the owner 
to some liability. In this case, plaintiff chose another route, 
ie. that the bidders would be responsible to make their own 
field investigations. A field inspection was set up where they 
could talk to the natives, ask all the questions they would, and 
see from road cuts, waterways, etc., and from all evidences on 
the ground as to what would be involved and in this manner they 
could determine what their costs would be. 
Mr. Tolman made the field inspection and when problem 
areas were pointed out, his response was "no problem". He 
returned to the job site on two more occasions and when he made 
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up his bid, he knew what the specifications said or didn't say 
and if there was any uncertainty about construction conditions he 
could have hedged his bet to cover all contingencies and bid 
accordingly or he didn't have to bid at all. After having done 
so, he should not be heard now to complain that the specifications 
did not properly inform him of the prevailing construction cond-
itions. 
As to the water conditions about which plaintiff complains, 
there is conflicting evidence as to just how bad it was or to 
what extent, if any, it affected the progress of construction. 
For example, defendant's witness Major testified that during the 
trial (late February, 1976) he rode over the project areas shown 
on Exhibit P-17 in red as being wet areas encountered during 
construction and in his opinion 75% of those areas were wet that 
day. (A.65, R.338). Likewise, during construction he did not 
recall seeing large amounts of irrigation water and except for 
points of canal crossings or river crossings, he didn't recall 
seeing any surface water flowing into the trenches. (R.338). 
Thus, plaintiff's characterization of the surface water condit-
ions are eitherly grossly exaggerated or imaginary and plaintiff's 
suggestion that defendant had the responsibility therefore just 
isn't so. 
Plaintiff seems to suggest that §4.4, par. 10(d), p.4.13 
of Ex. P-2 somehow places the responsibility on the Owner (defend-
ant) to control the surface water in the borrow pits where most of 
the construction took place. A simple reading thereof demonstrates 
that the only responsibilities of the Owner (defendant) related 
to the trench crossing farming areas to correlate the construction 
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with farming operations to minimize damage to crops. That was 
the sole nature and extent of defendant's responsibility in this 
regard. 
The case of U. S. v. Atlantic Dredging Company, 253 U.S. 
1 (1920) cited on pages 25-27 of Appellant's Brief is clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case. There the government 
made borings into the bed of the Delaware River which revealed 
impenetrable material and represented on the map exhibited to 
the bidders that the material to be encountered was "mainly mud 
or mud mixed with an admixture of sand". There was nothing on 
the map showing the field notes taken at the time the borings 
were made. Furthermore, the bid proposals required the bidder 
to describe the character and capacity of the plant proposed 
to be used which was approved by the government's contracting 
officer. The approved plant was adequate for dredging the mater-
ials described on the map but inadequate for dredging the mater-
ials encountered. Upon learning that impenetrable materials had 
been reached by the borings, Atlantic refused to complete the job. 
Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that 
the case came within the principle "that the contractor ought 
to be relieved, if he was misled, by erroneous statements in 
the specifications" and affirmed the judgment of the court of 
claims awarding the contractor its losses incurred because of 
misrepresentations as to existing conditions. Here plaintiff 
makes no claim that defendant misrepresented the existing cond-
itions, but asserts only that the specifications did not adequately 
inform plaintiff of the prevailing construction conditions. 
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Likewise, Hollerback v, U. S,, 233 U.S. 165 (1914) cited 
on page 27 of Appellant's Brief is clearly distinguishable from 
the instant case. There the contract covered the repair of an 
existing dam. The government specifications specifically repres-
ented that the dam was backed for about 50 feet with broken 
stone, sawdust and sediment to a height of within 2 or 3 feet 
of the crest when in fact such conditions did not exist. The 
Supreme Court held that the positive statement of such speci-
fication must be taken as true and binding upon the government 
and that the loss resulting from such misrepresentation must fall 
upon the government rather than the contractor even though the 
general specifications required the contractor to visit the 
site and ascertain the nature of the work. However, the Supreme 
Court noted that if the government wished to leave the matter 
open for the independent investigation of the claimants, it 
might easily have omitted the specification as to the character 
of the filling back of the dam which is akin to the instant case. 
It then noted that in its positive assertion, the government made 
a representation upon which claimants had the right to rely with-
out an investigation to prove its falsity. 
The so-called test of "justifiable reliance upon the 
plans and specifications'1, while not yet adopted in Utah so far 
as our research reveals, is of no moment here since there is no 
claim of misrepresentation in the plans and specifications. The 
Montana case of Hash v. Sundling and Sons, Inc., 436 P.2d 83 
(1967) cited on page 29 of Appellant's Brief is of no help here 
since there the sub-contractor was required to excavate to a 
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greater depth than that stated in the plans and specifications 
and it was only when he was required to go deeper than the sub-grade 
as established by the plans and specifications and as staked on 
the ground that he encountered the excessii/e wetness that required 
the additional work for which he sought recovery. Furthermore, 
the foreseeability of the conditions actually encountered was 
held to be purely and simply a question of fact and the trial 
court having determined such fact adversely to the defendant 
Sunderling based upon conflicting evidence foreclosed his conten-
tions on appeal. 
In the Montana case of Haggart Construction Co. v. State 
of Montana, 427 P.2d 686 (1967) cited on page 29 of Appellant's 
Brief, the State misrepresented that acceptable surfacing materials 
could be produced economically and in sufficient quantities for 
the proposed construction from three State^optioned gravel pits 
which were royalty free. The trial court found, among other 
things, that the gravel in all three pits was not suitable for 
the intended use. The State did not deny that the representations 
were misleading inasmuch as the gravel obtained was not of the 
quality indicated. Rather, the State relied on the exculpatory 
language in the contract. The Montana Court held that the 
representations of the State as to fitness of the gravel pits 
constituted a warranty and it could not hide behind the exculpatory 
language of the contract. However, it emphasized that it was 
not its holding that such exculpatory clause may not be enforced 
in other situations. 
Both Stock and Grove, Inc. v. U. St, 493 F.2d 629 (1974) 
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and U. S. v. Johnson (153 F.2d 846, 9th Cir. 1946) cited on page 
30 of Appellant's Brief involved misrepresentations by the govern-
ment of the suitability of materials from specific sources of 
supply for construction purposes and neither have any relevancy 
here. In both instances the lower tribunal found against the 
government on the facts and awarded damages to the contractor. 
In Stock and Grove, Inc., Supra, the Circuit Court noted that 
while the contractor was not required to employ a trained geolo-
gist who might have discovered the latent indications, he was 
not excused from making a site inspection or from discovering 
patent indications plainly, to a layman, contradicting the con-
tract documents. 
A reading of the cases cited on pages 32 and 33 of 
Appellant's Brief reveals that all of those cases are clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case and none of those cases 
are either controlling or persuasive under the facts of the 
instant case. More pointedly, we are at a loss to understand 
what bearing the Utah case of P.L.C. Landscape Const, v. Picca-
dilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562 (1972) 
has on the instant case since that case involved a subsequent 
oral agreement to change the original contract which clearly is 
not akin to this case. 
The sum and substance of it all is that the trial court 
specifically found that the plans and specifications were wholly 
adequate under the controverted facts of this case and that 
should end it. Plaintifffs argument that defendant should have 
conducted detailed subsurface investigations and should have in-
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eluded the results thereof in the plans and specifications to 
better inform the plaintiff is not only unrealistic but is un-
supported by any respectable authority either cited in Appellantfs 
Brief or otherwise• It takes little imagination to realize that 
had defendant conducted extensive borings and included those in 
the plans and specifications, plaintiff would now be claiming 
that the logs of those borings did not accurately represent the 
subsurface conditions of some 65 miles of pipeline routes and 
would be asking for additional compensation therefore. We respect-
fully submit that plaintiff's argument under this point is wholly 
without merit and should be treated accordingly. 
POINT III 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT DID 
NOT INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFfS PERFORMANCE OF THE 
CONTRACT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
One of the most hotly contested fact questions was 
whether there was any conflict between the plans and the easement 
procured from Duchesne County to lay the pipelines within the 
Duchesne County roads. The trial court resolved that fact question 
against plaintiff in its Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 15 and 16. 
There was only one instance in which plaintiff was stopped by the 
county (A.73, R.372) and that was on Line "C" when plaintiff 
began excavating in the roadway for approximately 10 to 2 0 feet. 
(A.67, R.343). Plaintiff was not lined up between the design 
stakes (A.73) which were off the shoulder of the road (R.343, 372) 
approximately 11 feet from the fence.(A.101, R.344, 469). The 
line was not flagged with lath since Mr. Tolman had not requested 
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it (A.73, R.372). The location of the line was referenced to the 
fence as shown on the construction drawings (Ex. P-3) which was 
in the borrow pit (R.375) and as finally constructed was three 
feet from the fence line. (Ex. P-3, D-58, A.102, R.469). 
The substance of it all is that plaintiff was not follow-
ing the line as shown on the plans because it was down in the 
borrow area. Rather, he started his trench on the shoulder of 
the road where it was easier digging. After that incident, the 
representatives of defendant met with County Commissioner Murray 
and toured the project showing him where the proposed lines would 
be located. After that the line location was not a factor or a 
problem with the county. (A.77, R.387). 
Key to it all is that under Specification No. 2.7.2 
(Ex. P-2, p.2.22) the field locations of all pipelines were 
established by drawings referenced to fixed objects, instructions 
in the field or construction stakes in the field as may be 
necessary. Defendant emphatically disagrees with plaintiff's 
assertion on page 38 of Appellant's Brief that there is no dis-
pute in the evidence to the fact that the line was not properly 
staked. To the contrary, there is no evidence to show other-
wise with one exception through the Warr property and that was 
corrected to the satisfaction of both parties. (A.67, R.349, 350). 
Exhibit P-3 showed the location of Line "C" referenced 
to the fence which was in the borrow area and not upon the road 
shoulder where plaintiff began digging and where plaintiff should 
not have been. Likewise, any changes in location of the pipe-
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lines about which plaintiff complains were for its benefit or at 
its request and the trial court so found, (F,19, R.34). 
Plaintiff contends that plaintifffs work was interfered 
with because of a conflict between the County Easement and the 
contract plans which the trial court refused to so find. To say 
that there is credible and uncontradicted evidence in the record 
of this case which proves those contended facts with such certainty 
that all reasonable minds must so find is incredible. Yet that 
is plaintiff's burden on this appeal under the authorities cited 
under Point I hereinabove. 
Next plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in 
finding that plaintiff was required under the terms of the con-
tract to furnish all water for testing, flushing, disinfecting 
and placing the lines into service. (F.10, R.31). Plaintiff 
says on page 40 of its Brief that there is no wording in §4.13 
which requires the contractor to furnish the water required. 
Yet plaintiff ignores its obligation to furnish all the necessary 
materials, labor, etc., and services necessary for the complete 
construction of the culinary water facilities and to furnish and 
pay for water for construction and that its payments per foot of 
pipe include pressure testing, disinfection, flushing and placing 
the line into service, all at plaintiff's expense. Likewise, 
plaintiff ignores that nowhere in the contract is defendant re-
quired to furnish water or any other materials. Rather, the 
plans and specifications were prepared such that the contractor 
would furnish his own water for construction. (A.90, R.437). 
The testing is for the purpose of discovering leaks 
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(A.103, R.471) and water from an adjacent canal could be used 
for that purpose but not for chlorination and final flushing. 
(A.103, R.472, 473)• We are at a loss to understand what is so 
ridiculous about that as plaintiff suggests on page 41 of its 
Brief. 
To say that the portion of the letter quoted on page 42 
of Appellant's Brief construed the specification in plaintiff's 
favor is nonsense. The letter tried to impress on plaintiff the 
necessity for completing the base system such that water could 
be delivered to Myton City as early as possible. And as noted 
by the witness Maxwell, if water was available from the well it 
could be used for that purpose but there was no commitment as 
to time. (R.473). The fact was that when water was finally 
available from the well the plaintiff was permitted to use it 
for testing. And the fact that plaintiff was not charged for 
it was a gratuity for which plaintiff should not complain. The 
referenced specification on page 41 of Appellant's Brief covers 
sterilization of the Steel Reservoirs (Ex. P-2, §4.12, par. 4, 
p. 4^5) and not the testing and disinfection of the water lines 
which are covered by a different section of the specifications. 
(Ex. P-2, §4.13, pp. 4.26, 4.27). Thus, to say that the former 
is superfluous completely misconstrues the applicable specific-
ations. 
In view of the above, there is substantial competent and 
credible evidence in the record to support the findings of the 
trial court that the contract required plaintiff to furnish all 
water for construction purposes including water for testing, dis-
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infection and flushing. Plaintiff has wholly failed to meet its 
burden on this appeal under its Point II as demonstrated above 
and as such plaintiff's arguments therein are without merit. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT IT 
WAS NOT IMPROPER OR UNREASONABLE FOR DEFENDANT 
TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLETE THE WORK WITHIN 
THE TIME SPECIFIED BY THE CONTRACT. 
We are at a loss to understand how plaintiff can complain 
that it was unreasonable for defendant to not award the contract 
until 57 days after the bid opening when the Information For 
Bidders specifically allowed the plaintiff 60 days after the 
bid opening date to award the contract. (Ex. P-2, §1.201h, p. 
1.2). At the time plaintiff submitted its bid, Mr. Tolman knew 
that plaintiff had up to 60 days to award the contract (A.42, 
R.252, 254) and that the project was to be financed by a loan 
or grant from the Farmers Home Administration. The fact is that 
the contract was awarded within the 60-day period very soon after 
completion of the legal documents with the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration for a release of the funds. (A.55, R.297). 
Next plaintiff complains that at several meetings in 
December, 1971, plaintiff asked for permission to suspend the 
work during the winter months which was rejected by defendant. 
The facts are that by letter dated October 15, 1971 (Ex. D-64) 
plaintiff was advised that it was behind schedule and was admon-
ished that construction weather probably will be more adverse 
during the last half of the contract and that very little or no 
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construction can be completed after January 1, 1972. Plaintiff 
was further notified that construction would have to proceed at 
approximately double the rate of progress to complete the project 
within the contract time which would expire February 18, 1972 
and plaintiff was reminded of the liquidated damages provision. 
By letter dated December 20, 1971 (Ex. D-64) plaintiff was ad-
vised that defendant would consider amending the liquidated 
damage provision of the contract if plaintiff would employ a 
competent superintendent and give priority to specified items 
of the work. By letter dated January 12, 1972 (Ex. D-64) plaint-
iff was advised that weather conditions in the Myton area have 
not been unusual or unexpected and plaintiff was again reminded 
that the liquidated damage provision would be modified only if 
the conditions specified were met which they were not. 
It is significant that when additional ledgerock was 
encountered, plaintiff made no request for additional time as 
required by the contract. Likewise when the new classification 
of consolidated or semi-consolidated material was agreed upon, 
plaintiff made no request for additional time. (Ex. D-64, letter 
dated November 6, 1971). Nor was any additional time provided 
for in the change orders as required by the contract (Ex. D-67; 
A.101, R.466a, 467; Ex. P-2, §2.505, p.2.16). Equally signifi-
cant is that some $19,000.00 in contract work were deleted with 
no corresponding reduction in contract time. 
The sum and substance of it all is that a construction 
period of six months on each schedule was considered ample for 
both schedules and an additional 9 0 days leeway was added to 
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arrive at the 270-day contract time. The work under each sched-
ule could proceed independently of each other. If, as here, 
both schedules were constructed by the same contractor, all he 
had to do was double his work force and equipment. Mr. Tolman 
knew that at the time plaintiff's bid was submitted. He knew 
that he could not get started until at least the latter part of 
May, 1971. Typical of his attitude is plaintiff's comment on 
page 44 of its brief that when the contractor bid the contract 
he contemplated doing the work within the 27 0 days, but antici-
pated that there would be appropriate extensions of time should 
the 27 0 days go into the extremely cold winter months. What 
plaintiff is saying is that the 270-day provision really didn't 
mean anything to it since if it got into trouble it could always 
get an extension in the contract time. Not so here. 
The natives of the area who testified on the subject 
stated that the 1971-72 winter weather conditions were normal 
for the area (A.10, R.113; A.80, R.399) and the official weather 
records verify the same. (Ex. D-68, D-69). 
The trial court specifically found that the contract 
time was more than sufficient to complete the project; that no 
additional time was requested by plaintiff to complete any of 
the items of extra work and that any additional time required 
for the performance thereof was more than offset by the time 
allowed for the performance of the deleted work. (F.12, R.32). 
Accordingly, plaintiff's arguments are wholly without merit. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DEFENDANT 
THE RETAINED LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF $8,400.00 
The trial court found that plaintiff breached the contract 
dated May 7, 1971 by its failure to complete the work without reas-
onable cause for delay and as a direct result thereof defendant 
was damaged by the delay in providing culinary water to its con-
sumers and by incurring additional extra costs for inspection in 
the sum of $8,500.00. (F.17, R.33, 34). It further found that 
the retained liquidated damages of $8,400.00 was the agreed 
liquidated damages and was reasonable and not a penalty. (F.18, 
R.34). The failure of plaintiff to complete the project within 
the contract time resulted solely from plaintiff's conduct or 
misconduct. Thus, the case of Gogo, et al v. Los Angeles County 
Flood Control District, 114 P.2d 65 (Calif. 1941) cited on page 
48 of Appellant's Brief is simply not in point. Likewise, the 
Washington case of Bignold v. King County, 399 P.2d 611 (Wash. 
1965) cited on pages 46 and 49 of Appellant's Brief is not in 
point. There the trial court found that the failure of the 
county's engineers to shut down the job was arbitrary and capri-
tious and that appellant was "locked in" by the findings which 
negate the exercise of the requisite good faith by the county's 
engineers. Here the opposite is true. The trial court specifi-
cally found that the winter weather conditions in the area of 
the work were not unusually severe with the temperatures being 
above normal and precipitation being near normal and the evid-
ence failed to show that defendant unreasonably refused to grant 
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plaintiff's request for an extension of time, Accordingly, 
plaintiff has wholly failed to sustain its burden on this point 
in this appeal and under the accepted rules of appellant review 
neither the Findings or Judgment of the trial court thereon 
should be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made and entered Findings favorable to 
the defendant- The presumption of the correctness and validity 
of such Findings has not been overcome by plaintiff nor has it 
demonstrated that there is no substantial evidence to support 
such Findings or that the trial court misapplied the law. The 
record is replete with contradictory evidence and testimony on 
all of plaintiff's contentions. The refusal of the trial court 
to make Findings favorable to plaintiff can only be disturbed 
if the record shows credible and uncontradicted evidence which 
proves plaintiff1s contentions with such certainty that all 
reasonable minds must so find. Clearly that is not the case 
here. 
The sum and substance of it all is that plaintiff failed 
to complete the contract within the contract time solely as a 
result of its own conduct or misconduct and it should not expect 
defendant to bail it out to the tune of $113,899.98 or any sum. 
Plaintiff's self-caused delays cost the defendant an additional 
$8,500.00 in inspection fees which defendant should not have to 
absorb. The trial court was correct in every respect in the way 
it decided this case and that decision should not be disturbed. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted 
( J6sepfT Novak 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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